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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Congress instituted sweeping legislative reform in the
securities industry with the enactment of the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act (PSLRA).' The purpose of the PSLRA is to limit
abusive practices in securities litigation.2 Among the many notable
provisions of the PSLRA is section 107, which amends the civil pro-
visions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).3 Section 107 eliminates "RICO liability for most securities
fraud claims, except for those premised on securities violations
where criminal convictions have been entered," and is meant to
"protect corporations against the filing of frivolous securities ac-
tions., 4  Accordingly, Congress eliminated the pleading of mail
fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud as predicate acts under civil
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and at 18 U.S.C. § 1964).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 27-34.
3. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 107, 109 Stat. at 758 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. I 1995)); see also Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
4. In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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RICO if the offenses are based on conduct that also would be ac-
tionable as securities fraud.5 In doing so, Congress precluded the
availability of a civil RICO cause of action in securities fraud cases;
however, Congress did not clearly dictate whether section 107 ap-
plies prospectively only or whether pending RICO claims are ex-
tinguished as well. The amendments under the PSLRA "shall not
affect or apply to any private action arising under title I of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 or title I of the Securities Act of
1933, commenced before and pending on the date of enactment of
this Act";6 however, the Act is silent as to its retroactive application
to civil RICO claims. Furthermore, various courts have inter-
preted the application of section 107 differently to pending civil
RICO claims.8
This Article reviews the use of civil RICO in the context of se-
curities fraud claims9 and sets forth section 107 of the PSLRA as it
amends civil RICO.10 In an attempt to determine the applicability
of section 107 to pending cases, this Article discusses various theo-
5. See S. RFP. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
698; 141 CONG. REc. H13,692-705 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995). Congress intended
section 107 to include claims of wire and mail fraud associated with the purchase
or sale of securities as evidenced by the following:
The Conference Committee amends section 1964(c) of title 18 of the
U.S. Code to remove any conduct that would have been actionable as
fraud in the purchase or sale of securities as racketeering activity under
civil RICO. The Committee intends this amendment to eliminate securi-
ties fraud as a predicate offense in a civil RICO action. In addition, the
Conference Committee intends that a plaintiff may not plead other
specified offenses, such as mail or wire fraud, as predicate acts under
civil RICO if such offenses are based on conduct that would have been
actionable as securities fraud.
141 CONG. REC. H13,704 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995); see also In re Prudential Sec., 930
F. Supp. at 77 (summarizing the PSLRA's effect on plaintiffs' RICO claims).
6. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 108, 109 Stat. at 758 (emphasis
added).
7. See In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 77.
8. See discussion infra Part VI. Compare District 65 Retirement Trust for
Members of the Bureau of Wholesale Sales Reps. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F.
Supp. 1551, 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (explaining that the PSLRA does not apply ret-
roactively to bar RICO claims), and In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 77, 80-81
(holding that the PSLRA applies prospectively only), and Bromm v. Premier Capi-
tal Invs. Corp., No. 4:CV-95-3327, slip op. at 4 (D. Neb. May 30, 1996) (providing
prospective application of statute only), with Reading Wireless Cable Television
Partnership v. Steingold, No. CV-5-95-785-DWH (LRL), 1996 WL 728045, at *3 (D.
Nev. July 23, 1996) (providing prospective application and application to pending
claims).
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part III.
19971
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ries of statutory interpretation and legislative intent.11 This Article
then reviews the body of law governing the retroactive application
of laws, 12 including the case of Landgraf v. USI Film Products,"2 in
which the United States Supreme Court set forth a test to deter-
mine whether a statute can be applied retroactively. 4 In addition,
this Article reviews recent court decisions that analyze whether sec-
tion 107 of the PSLRA applies to pending RICO claims. 5 Based on
statutory construction, legislative intent, and principles of retroac-
tivity, this Article concludes that section 107's amendment to civil
RICO contained in section 107 of the PSLRA should apply to pend-
ing RICO claims, thereby precluding plaintiffs from relying on civil
RICO in pending securities fraud cases.
II. CIVIL RICO IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS
After almost twenty years of investigation into the problem of
organized crime, 6 Congress enacted RICO in 1970. 7 The criminal
11. See discussion infra Part TV.
12. See discussion infra Part V.
13. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
14. Id. at 280.
15. See discussion infra Part VI.
16. See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 249-80 (1982) (discussing the legisla-
tive history of RICO). In 1951, the Special Committee to Investigate Organized
Crime in Interstate Commerce (the Kefauver Committee, named after Senator
Estes Kefauver) reported that organized crime had infiltrated businesses and state
and local governments. See id. at 249. The American Bar Association thereafter
established the ABA Commission on Organized Crime to explore legislative solu-
tions to the problem of organized crime. See id. In 1967, the President's Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (the Katzenbach
Commission) reported on the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate busi-
ness, and recommended that new approaches be taken to stop the infiltration. See
id. at 251-53. After initial attempts in 1967 to amend antitrust laws to make them
applicable to organized crime, and after several organized crime bills failed in
Congress, Congress finally passed RICO in 1970. See id. at 253-80.
For commentary on the background and history of RICO, see GREGORY P.
JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE § 2, at 2-3 (1992); G. Robert Blakey &
Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technol-
ogy Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar
Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 526, 529-39, 548 (1989); G. Robert Blakey & Tho-
mas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the
Various Proposals For Reform: "Mother of God - Is This the End of RICO ?, "43 VAND. L.
REv. 851, 853-920 (1990) [hereinafter Mother of God]; Ronald M. Goldberg, RICO
Forfeiture of Sexually Explicit Expressive Materials: Another Weapon in the War on Por-
nography, or an Impermissible Collateral Attack on Protected Expression - Alexander v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993), 21 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 231, 235-38
(1995); Raymond P. Green, The Application of RICO to Labor-Management and Em-
[Vol. 23$
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RICO provision provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity... to use or invest, directly or indi-
rectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establish-
ment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
18
commerce.
In addition to the criminal RICO provision, Congress also en-
acted a civil RICO provision, which allows private individuals to sue
for RICO violations.' 9 Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the
civil RICO statute provided:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.20
Plaintiffs have a four-year statute of limitations within which to
bring these civil RICO claims.2
ployment Disputes, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 309, 309-12 (1995); Bart A. Karwath, Recent
Developments in Civil RICO Law, 27 IND. L. REv. 1151, 1151-52 (1994); Theresa E.
Loscalzo & StacyJ. Levitan, RICO Conspiracy: Whistleblowers - Coming in Through the
Back Door, 10 LAB. LAW. 679, 679-81 (1994); Ira H. Raphaelson & Michelle D. Ber-
nard, RICO and the "Operation or Management" Test: The Potential Chilling Effect on
Criminal Prosecutions, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 669, 669-75 (1994); Barry Tarlow, RICO
Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 302-11 (1983); Diane Lynne Virzera, Redirecting the
Debate on "Garden Variety" Abuses of Civil RICO: Suitability Rule Violations and the
Case for Treble Damages, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 341, 353-58 (1993). See gen-
erally G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009
(1980) (providing an overview of RICO); Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress,
and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REv. 837 (1980) (analyzing Con-
gress' legislative intent in enacting RICO and the courts' interpretation of RICO);
Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FoRDHAM L. REv.
165 (1980) (discussing the purpose of RICO and the broad interpretation of Title
IX by the courts).
17. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970); see also G. Robert
Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Securities Reform and RICO: A Lawyer's Dream, 23 RICO L.
REP. 802, 802 (1996) (explaining the enactment of RICO) [hereinafter A Lawyer's
Dream].
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994).
19. Id. § 1964(c). Civil RICO was enacted, in part, substantially to supple-
ment the Department of Justice's limited resources allotted to enforce antitrust
laws and deter violations. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
21. The Supreme Court has established a uniform four-year statute of limi-
1997]
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Although commentators disagree about whether civil RICO
can and should be used in the securities context," plaintiffs often
tations for civil RICO claims. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987). Before Agency Holding Corp., courts used several
different approaches to RICO statute of limitations issues. Some courts "used the
state limitations period most similar to the predicate offenses alleged in the par-
ticular RICO claim." Id. at 148 (citing Silverberg v. Thomson McKinnon Sec.,
Inc., 787 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1986); Burns v. Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837 (D. Minn.
1984)). Other courts'used "a uniform statute of limitations applicable to all civil
RICO actions brought within a given State." Id. at 148-49 (citing Tellis v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1986); Compton v. Ide, 732
F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984); Teltronics Servs., Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F.
Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). The only similarity in the courts' approaches to
RICO's statute of limitations was the use of state statutes of limitations instead of
the federal statutes of limitations. See id. at 149. However, the Court found that
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994), was "a far closer analogy to RICO than any
state law alternative." Id. at 150. Accordingly, the Court held that the Clayton
Act's four-year statute of limitations should also apply to civil RICO causes of ac-
tion. See id. at 152, 156.
22. See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities
Markets: The Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 896,
928-29 (1990). Mr. Mathews argues that despite academicians' strong support of
civil RICO as a replacement for a federal commercial fraud statute in securities
and corporate matters, the legislature intended RICO primarily to eradicate or-
ganized crime from legitimate business and labor unions. See id. Mr. Mathews
further notes that civil RICO has been "overused or abused in a floodgate of cases
having nothing to do with driving organized crime out of legitimate business." Id.
at 929. But see Mother of God, supra note 16, at 860-69 (arguing that RICO was not
designed only to drive organized crime out of legitimate business).
For additional commentary on the use of RICO in the securities context, see
A Lawyer's Dream, supra note 17, and Andrew P. Bridges, Private RICO Litigation
Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L. REv. 43, 54-78 (1983). See gen-
erallyJenniferJ. Johnson, Predators['] Rights: Multiple Remedies For Wall Street Sharks
Under the Securities Law and RICO, 10J. CORP. L. 3 (1984) (discussing remedies for
the thwarted tender offeror under the Williams Act, the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act, and RICO); Louis C. Long, Treble Damages For Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK.
L. REv. 201 (1981) (analyzing the use of RICO in securities fraud cases for pur-
poses of obtaining treble damages); Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act: Powerful New Tool of the Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 U.
KAN. L. REV. 7 (1982) (explaining how defrauded securities plaintiffs can use
RICO to broaden the substantive or remedial basis of the traditional statutory
fraud claims in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934); Harvey L. Pitt, et al., Pursuing Federal Securities Law Violations Through the Use
of RICO: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Holmes Decision, 623 PLI/COMM. 325
(1992) (discussing the 1992 United States Supreme Court's decision in Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp.); Kevin P. Roddy, Professionals' Liability for Viola-
tions of the Federal Securities Laws, RICO and State Law Claims, 838 PLI/CoRP. 271
(1994) (examining different theories of liability which may be asserted against at-
torneys or accountants to hold them liable to third parties in financial transac-
tions); Dana L. Wolff, Legislative Reform, RICO's Role in Securities Fraud Litigation:
Should it be Facilitated or Restricted?, 21 J. LEGIS. 359 (1995) (arguing Congress
[Vol. 23
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file civil RICO claims along with, or instead of, traditional securities
claims.2" Civil RICO makes it unlawful to engage in a variety of
should amend section 1961 (1) (D) of RICO to state that a plaintiff need not be a
purchaser or seller of securities to have standing to sue under RICO); Michael N.
Glanz, Comment, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1513 (1983) (examining the current proliferation of RICO charges in securi-
ties cases).
23. Most private securities causes of action are brought under sections 11
and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 and under section 10(b) of the Securities Act
of 1934 as set forth by Rule 1Ob-5. See Mathews, supra note 22, at 902. Section 11
is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994). Section 12 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1994). Rule lOb-5, under which section 10(b) claims are filed, is codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
Section 11 "creates an express cause of action for damages for purchasers of
securities in an SEC-registered public offering when the relevant registration
statement contains false or misleading statements of material fact or omissions of
material fact." Mathews, supra note 22, at 906 (footnote omitted). Anyone who
acquires securities issued under the defective registration statement can bring a
cause of action unless the person acquiring the securities knew that the registra-
tion statement was defective when he or she brought the action. See id. at 907.
The plaintiff must prove that the securities he or she purchased are traceable di-
rectly to the offering covered by the defective registration statement. See id. Fur-
thermore, actions under section 11 must be filed within one year of the discovery
of the defective nature of the registration statement but not more than three years
after the security was offered to the public. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994).
Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides for two separate causes of
action. Section 12(1) provides that anyone who "offers or sells a security in viola-
tion of section 77e" of title 15 is liable for damages to those buying the security.
Id. § 771(1). Section 12(2) provides a cause of action for the buyer of a security
when the offer or sale of such security included a false statement of material fact
or an omission of material fact which was necessary to avoid making the statement
not misleading where the buyer was unaware of the false statement or omission.
Id. § 771(2). Like section 11 claims, claims brought under section 12(1) must be
filed within one year of the discovery of the defective nature of the registration
statement but not more than three years after the security was offered to the pub-
lic. See id. § 77m. A buyer must bring a section 12(2) claim within one year after
the discovery of the misstatement or omission but not longer than three years af-
ter the sale of the security in question. See id.; Mathews, supra note 22, at 910.
Rule lob-5 "is a general anti-fraud and anti-manipulative provision which
creates an implied right of action in favor of anyone injured as a result of fraudu-
lent activity in connection with the purchase or sale of a security." Mathews, supra
note 22, at 914. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
1997]
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24racketeering activities and defines "racketeering activity" using a
list of predicate acts. 25 Included among these predicate acts are
those that securities plaintiffs use to plead RICO causes of action:
mail, wire, and securities fraud.26
The possibility of treble damages and attorneys' fees, the use
of mail, wire, and securities fraud as predicate acts, and the four-
year statute of limitations period encourage plaintiffs with securi-
ties fraud claims to structure their complaints, oftentimes crea-
tively, to fall within civil RICO.27 Doing so gives plaintiffs the op-
portunity for increased damage awards and, essentially, greater
bargaining power to negotiate pretrial settlements.28 Moreover, the
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Mathews, supra note 22, at 914-26 (discussing Rule
1Ob-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). For discussion of additional
causes of action under securities laws, see Mathews, supra note 22, at 902 n.26
(discussing claims and citing cases and commentary).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994). To determine whether a person violates the
RICO statute the necessary and requisite factors used are that a person must:
(a) use income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire
an interest in an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce; (b) acquire
or maintain an interest in an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering activity; (c) conduct the affairs of an
enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of racket-
eering activity; or (d) conspire to commit (a), (b), or (c).
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994); Mathews, supra note 22, at 926 n.162.
25. Mathews, supra note 22, at 926 n.162. "Racketeering activities" include
.any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, brib-
ery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance."
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
26. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143,
149 (1987) (stating that most civil RICO complaints are predicated on the use of
mail fraud, wire fraud or securities fraud); Gary G. Lynch & Thomas P. Ogden,
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Civil RICO Reform4 923 PLI/CoP.
623, 630-31 (1996) (reporting that "[b]y the mid-1980's, it was estimated that
thirty-five percent of published civil RICO decisions relied solely or primarily on
allegations of securities fraud; approximately ninety percent relied upon one of
the three 'commercial fraud' predicate offenses - mail fraud, wire fraud, or secu-
rities fraud").
27. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 504-06 (1985) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("It does not take great legal insight to realize that such a plaintiff
would pursue his case under RICO," because "a successful plaintiff will recover
both treble damages and attorney's fees"); Mathews, supra note 22, at 936-44 (dis-
cussing the plaintiffs advantages of pursuing a civil RICO claim over other securi-
ties claims); ChiefJustice William H. Rehnquist, Address at the Eleventh Seminar
on the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7, 1989), in 21 ST. MARY's L.J. 5, 12 (1989)
(stating that RICO's treble damages strongly encourage attorneys to bring facts
typically thought to underlie other causes of action within RICO's reach).
28. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that due to
the possibility of treble damages under civil RICO, many defendants would rather
settle a meritless case than face "ruinous exposure"); Mathews, supra note 22, at
[Vol. 23
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longer statute of limitations under civil RICO provides an alterna-
tive for stale claims that otherwise would be precluded.2 9 Accord-
ingly, in many instances, plaintiffs will use civil RICO "for extortive
purposes, giving rise to the very evils it was designed to combat.
" 30
In essence, civil RICO has become "a feeding frenzy for plaintiffs'
lawyers.' Commentators, 2 legislators,u and judgess alike have
called for reform.
III. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
Many years of collaborative effort to reform abusive securities
litigation practices culminated in the passage of the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 35
939 (stating that plaintiffs with weak civil RICO claims nonetheless negotiate fa-
vorable settlements because of RICO's automatic imposition of costs, attorneys'
fees, and potential treble damages).
29. See Mathews, supra note 22, at 938-39.
30. In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 80
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
31. Martha Cochran, Sweeping Reform: Litigating and Bespeaking Caution Under
the New Securities Law, 924 PLI/CoRP. 31,122 (1996).
32. See generally Symposium, Reforming RICO: If, Why, and How ?, 43 VAND. L.
REv. 621 (1990) (suggesting that the only civil RICO suits should be the kind the
Department of Justice would bring as original cases); Norman Abrams, A New Pro-
posal For Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1989) (proposing that
private RICO claims should be "approved" by the prosecutor's office before being
pursued).
33. See Mathews, supra note 22, at 899-900 (noting that Congress continues
to debate the abuse of civil RICO's treble damages provision available in securities
and other commercial litigation); see also Amending the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act, S. REP. No. 101-269 (1990); Oversight on Civil RICO Suits:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 99-37 (1986); RICO Re-
form: Hearings on H.R. 2517, H.R. 2943, H.R. 4892, H.R. 5290, H.R. 5391, and H.R.
5445 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. REP.
No. 99-140 (1985).
34. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500-01 (1985) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the language and history of civil RICO supports a
narrow interpretation); Rehnquist, supra note 27, at 12 (stating that civil RICO
requires some limitations).
35. See A Lawyer's Dream, supra note 17, at 804. The PLSRA includes provi-
sions for securities litigation reform (§ 101), a safe harbor for forward-looking
statements (§ 102), elimination of certain abusive practices (§ 103), authority of
the Commission to prosecute aiding and abetting (§ 104), loss causation (§ 105),
and protections for senior citizens and qualified retirement plans (§ 106). Private
Litigation Securities Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and at 18 U.S.C. § 1964). In passing this
Act, both the House and the Senate insisted on the addition of a savings clause
which bars civil RICO actions in certain instances. See S. 240, 104th Cong. § 110
(2d version June 20, 1995). Civil RICO actions are barred when the conduct
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A. Legislative History
1. The House Bill
The original version of the PSLRA, House Bill 1058, was in-
troduced in the United States House of Representatives on Febru-
ary 27, 1995.36 The bill provided in part: "This Act and the
amendments made by this Act are effective on the date of enact-
ment of this Act and shall apply to cases commenced after such
date of enactment. 37 The original version of the House bill made
no reference to RICO claims.m
Although the bill had been referred to the House Committee
on Commerce and to the Judiciary Committee, the House Rules
Committee adopted a modified open rule on March 7, 1995,
whereby the bill would be brought straight to the House floor for a
one-hour general debate and not more than eight hours of
amendments. 39 Despite vocal opposition from House Democrats,
Congress adopted the modified open rule.40 Immediately thereaf-
ter, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole to
consider the bill.4'
Following general debate,42 Representative Christopher Cox, a
Republican from California, 43 proposed an amendment to the bill
that would bar plaintiffs from bringing RICO claims "if the racket-
eering activity, as defined in [18 U.S.C. §] 1961(1)(D), involve[d]
conduct actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.""
Responding to criticism that the modified open rule unreasonably
could be actionable as fraud. See A Lawyer's Dream, supra note 17, at 809. Con-
gress' attempt to limit civil RICO actions created confusion throughout the judi-
ciary. See infra notes 140-68 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions in
District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Wholesale Sales Reps.
v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Ga. 1996); In re Prudential Sec.,
930 F. Supp. 68; and Bromm v. Premier Capital Invs. Corp., No. 4: CV-95-3327 (D.
Neb. May 30, 1996)). See generally A Lawyer's Dream, supra note 17, at 809-10. The
Act fails to specify whether it applies to pending civil RICO actions.
36. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 7 (1st version Mar. 1, 1995), reprinted in 141
CONG. REc. H2767-70 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995).
37. Id.
38. 141 CONG. REc. H2767-70 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Cox).
39. Id. (statement of Rep. Dreier).
40. See 141 CONG. REc. H2749-59 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (H.R. Res. 105).
41. See 141 CONG. REc. H2749-60 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995).
42. See 141 CONG. REc. H2749-67 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995).
43. See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 7 (1st version Mar. 1, 1995). Representa-
tive Cox was one of the chief sponsors of House Bill 1058. Id.
44. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 6 (2d version Mar. 10, 1995).
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curtailed meaningful debate on such an important issue, Represen-
tative Cox stated that the amendment's omission was inadvertent
and that the amendment had not been opposed in committee.45
After much debate, Congress passed the amendment.46 The savings
clause prohibiting a RICO cause of action for conduct actionable
as securities fraud remained in the bill,47 and on March 10, 1995,
the House referred House Bill 1058 to the Senate."
2. The Senate Bill
The original version of Senate Bill 240, the Senate companion
to House Bill 1058, was introduced on January 18, 1995.40 It con-
tained RICO language strongly resembling the House bill's, but it
contained no general savings clause.50 After hearings before the
Senate Subcommittee on Securities, the Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee reported the bill back to the Senate with
an amendment that essentially rewrote the bill.51 While retaining
many of the features of the original Senate Bill 240, this amend-
ment considerably expanded the legislation's reach. An amend-
ment to the RICO provision would prevent any person from rely-
ing on conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the
purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section
1962.52 Also included was a savings clause with respect to securities
claims: "The amendments made by this title shall not affect or ap-
ply to any private action arising under title I of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 or title I of the Securities Act of 1933, com-
menced before the date of enactment of this Act.
5 3
The full Senate began debate on the committee's substitute
45. See 141 CONG. REc. H2765, H2770 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995). Representa-
tive Cox's remarks regarding committee debate apparently were made in refer-
ence to House Bill 10, which contained the RICO language and was succeeded by
House Bill 1058. Id.
46. See 141 CONG. REc. H2765, H2778-79 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995).
47. See H.R. 1058 § 9 (2d & 3d versions Mar. 10 & 12, 1995).
48. See 141 CONG. REC. S3803 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995).
49. See 141 CONG. REc. S1070 (daily ed.Jan. 18, 1995).
50. SeeS. 240 § 105 (1st version Jan. 22, 1995). The Senate bill read: Sec-
tion 1964(c) of RICO "is amended by inserting ', except that no person may bring
an action under this provision if the racketeering activity as defined in section
1961 (1)(D), involves fraud in the sale of securities' before the period." Id.
51. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 1; see also 141 CONG. REc. S8614 (daily ed. June
19, 1995).
52. See S. 240, 104th Cong. § 107 (2d version June 20, 1995).
53. S. 240, 104th Cong. § 110 (2dversionJune 20, 1995).
1997]
11
Noteboom and Korengold: Nunc Pro Tunc: The Application of the Private Securities Litigati
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAWREVEW
bill on June 22, 1995."4 On June 26, 1995, Senator Joseph Biden, a
Democrat from Delaware, proposed an "exception to the excep-
tion" RICO amendment, whereby a plaintiff still could pursue
RICO relief "if any participant in the [securities] fraud is criminally
convicted in connection therewith."- The Senate adopted this
amendment by a voice vote. 6
The Senate returned House Bill 1058 to the House after strik-
ing everything following the enacting clause and substituting the
language from the Senate's amended version of Senate Bill 240.5'
Thus, the Senate version of House Bill 1058 included RICO provi-
sions 8 and Senate Bill 240's savings clause regarding securities
claims.59
3. The Final Bill
The House rejected the Senate's amended version of House
Bill 1058.60 Accordingly, a House/Senate Conference Committee
met in late November 1995 and returned a bill that contained the
Senate's version of the RICO amendment, the "exception to the
exception" version, and a new savings clause with respect to private
securities actions: "The amendments made by this title shall not
affect or apply to any private action arising under title I of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 or title I of the Securities Act of
1933, commenced before and pending on the date of the enactment
of this Act.",6 The Senate approved the conference report 62 and the
House followed suit.63 Although President Clinton vetoed the bill
on December 19, 1995,6 the House and Senate overrode the Presi-
54. See 141 CONG. REc. S8935-43 (daily ed. June 22, 1995).
55. 141 CONG. REC. S9163 (daily ed.June 27, 1995); see also H.R. 1058, 104th
Cong. § 111 (4th version June 29, 1995). The Senate also adopted other amend-
ments not pertinent to this Article. See id.
56. See 141 CONG. REc. S9163 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
57. See generally H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (4th version June 29, 1995).
58. Id. §§ 107, 111.
59. Seeid. § 112.
60. See 141 CONG. REC. H10,690 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995).
61. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. §§ 107-08 (5th version Dec. 8, 1995) (emphasis
added).
62. See 141 CONG. REc. S17,997 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995). The Senate ap-
proved the report by a vote of 65-30. Id.
63. See 141 CONG. REC. H14,055 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995). The House ap-
proved the report by a vote of 320-102. Id.
64. See Michael K Frisby & Jeffrey Taylor, Clinton Vetoes Bill Limiting Securities
Suits, WALL ST.J., Dec. 20, 1995, atA3.
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dent's veto, 65 and on December 22, 1996, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act became law.66
B. The Purpose and Relevant Provisions of the Act
Congress enacted the PSLRA to cure certain evils that had sur-
faced in some securities lawsuits. In addition, PSLRA amends the
civil provision of RICO by barring claims predicated on securities
fraud, unless the potential civil defendants are first convicted un-
67der RICO's criminal provisions. Congress included the civil RICO
amendment in response to growing concern over the misuse of
civil RICO in securities fraud claims. 8  Specifically, section 107
65. See Sharon Walsh, House Overrides Veto of Securities Bill; Senate May Vote To-
day on Frivolous Shareholder Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1995, at A20.
66. Aaron Zitner, For First Time, Veto by Clinton Overridden, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 23, 1995, at 1.
67. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §
107, 109 Stat. 737, 758.
68. See 141 CONG. REc. H2771 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995). Many other repre-
sentatives also supported the civil RICO amendment to prevent further abuse of
civil RICO for securities fraud claims. For example, "Rep [resentative] McCollum,
a supporter of the amendment, advanced the argument that RICO was originally
intended to strike a major blow to organized crime and racketeering, and it was
an abuse to use RICO against ordinary fraud in the context of commercial and se-
curities disputes." A Lauryer's Dream, supra note 17, at 805-06 (quoting 141 CONG.
REC. H2773-74 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (emphasis added)). Representative
McCollum argued that the remedies of civil RICO were calculated to help private
citizens fight against criminal enterprises and other corrupt organizations. See id.
However, Representative McCollum stressed that Congress did not design the
remedies to be used to litigate disputes between parties to bona fide securities
transactions. See id. at 806 (citing 141 CONG. REc. H2774 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995)
(statement by Rep. McCollum)). Further, proponents of the proposed securities
reforms emphasized that Congress designed the proposed changes to RICO to
stop abuses such as "strike suits" and "shake downs," in which "plaintiffs' lawyers
bring massive lawsuits against small, vulnerable companies merely because their
stock prices dropped." Id. (citing 141 CONG. REc. H2775 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995)
(statement by Rep. Tauzin)). They argued that the lawyers sue everybody con-
nected to the company - officers, board members, accountants, lawyers - "and
then sit back and do discovery and continue the litigation until somebody says,
wait a minute, we have had enough, here is 10 cents on the dollar." See 141 CONG.
REC. H2775 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995); see also A Lawyer's Dream, supra note 17, at
806. Arthur Levitt, chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, wrote the
following in a prepared statement to the House subcommittee:
For many years, the Commission has supported legislation to eliminate
the overlap between the private remedies under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and under the Federal
Securities laws. Because the securities laws generally provide adequate
remedies for those injured by securities fraud, it is both unnecessary and
unfair to expose defendants in securities cases to the threat of treble
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amended a portion of the civil RICO statute contained in section
1964(c) of RICO, which now reads:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee,
except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have
been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of the securities to
establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in
the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any
person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud,
in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the
date on which the conviction becomes final.6 9
The RICO amendment constitutes a key element in a compre-
hensive strategy to foil "those who seek to line their own pockets by
bringing abusive and meritless suits," while preserving suitable
remedies for those genuinely victimized by securities fraud y.7  Con-
gress clearly intended the RICO amendment to "prevent duplica-
tive recovery" for claims arising out of securities fraud7' and to give
broader protection to corporate defendants by limiting the filing
of "frivolous" securities claims.
Congress was not clear, however, as to the scope of section 107
damages and other extraordinary remedies provided by RICO.
Hearings on Securities Litigation Reform Proposals before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1251 (1995).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. 11995) (emphasis added).
70. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
71. See District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Whole-
sale Sales Reps. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
Congress limited private RICO actions by mandating that "persons 'injured in
[their] business or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962' may not 'rely
upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or
sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c) (Supp. 11995)).
72. See In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnership Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). The Act received support from numerous members of Congress,
including Senator D'Amato, who stated:
This legislation has been four years in the making. It is a thoughtful and
carefully crafted bill. The provisions in the conference report are bal-
anced to make the legal system fairer for investors. The current system
does not protect investors, it exploits them .... Plaintiffs' lawyers know
that and take advantage. It is time to reform the securities class action
litigation from a moneymaking enterprise for lawyers into a better means
of recovery for investors.
141 CONG. REc. S17,933 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995).
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of the PSLRA. With respect to its curtailment of actions under
RICO, Congress did not clarify whether the Act is restricted to pro-
spective application only, or whether it is intended to apply to
pending RICO claims as well. The savings clause of the PSLRA,
contained in section 108, provides, "The amendments made by this
title shall not affect or apply to any private action arising under title
I of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or title I of the Securities
Act of 1933, commenced before and pending on the date of enact-
ment of this Act."73 Notably, this provision is devoid of any refer-
ence to the application of the RICO amendment, but refers only to
claims brought under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. The am-
biguity inherent in the savings clause fails to provide a bright-line
rule with respect to the RICO amendment's effect on pending liti-
gation.
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The absence of any savings clause in regard to RICO claims
leads to speculation and requires evaluation. When a statute is si-
lent as to any part of its application, courts necessarily must inter-
pret the statute to apply it to various situations. Accordingly, courts
have developed canons of statutory construction to assist in analyz-
ing how statutes should be interpreted. 4 Three such canons are:
73. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §
108, 109 Stat. at 758 (emphasis added).
74. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Con-
struction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 671 (1992) (concluding that
canons of statutory construction "allow judges to decide cases that involve increas-
ingly technical legal issues on the basis of familiar, if content-free, generic legal
rules that can be transported from case to case and from legal problem to legal
problem like a set of handy, all-purpose tools"); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 20, 38 (1988) (emphasizing that
the canons of statutory construction provide the interpreter with an ability to un-
derstand "later-enacted legislation on the earlier"); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role
of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 59, 61 (1988)
(contending that the relevant inquiry is not legislative intent, but statutory lan-
guage) (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV.
L. REv. 417, 419 (1899), reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECrED LEGAL
PAPERS 204, 207 (1920)); Richard A. Epstein, The Pitfalls of Interpretation, 7 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL. 101, 106 (1984) (offering questions to various modes of interpre-
tation and how they work with a specific statute); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Inter-
pretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 294-95 (1989) (arguing that
while "legislative supremacy" is an incomplete guide to judicial decision-making, it
is far from inconsequential); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legisla-
tion Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Method, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
223, 225 (1986) (arguing that judicial interpretation is consistent with the consti-
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(1) the plain meaning rule,75 (2) expressio unius est exclusio alterius,7
and (3) an evaluation of legislative intent. 
7
The plain meaning rule is often the first place courts look to
interpret statutes. 7 Although different interpretations of the plain
meaning rule exist,79 basically, if a word or phrase is not defined in
tutional scheme when it serves as a check on the legislature and does not intrude
upon the legislature's lawmaking authority); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the
Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1179, 1180-81 (stating that when a court
defers to statutory language and the result is misguided in terms of societal policy,
the possibility exists that other decision-makers may solve problems in similar ways
rather than on more sound grounds); Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Inter-
pretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431, 439 (1989) (redefining the three canons
of statutory construction as being formulative, mentalist, and purposive).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
78. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) ("(Wle begin, of course, with the language of the stat-
ute."); North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983) ("With any case
involving statutory interpretation, ... 'in determining the scope of a statute, one
is to look first at its language."') (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460
U.S. 103, 110 (1982)); Broad Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) ("[S]tatutory construction 'must begin with the language
of the statute itself.'" (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S.
176, 187 (1980))).
79. See NORMANJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01,
at 81 (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND] ("What has come to be known as
the plain meaning rule has been given expression in a variety of ways."). "The
plain meaning rule has several variants, ranging from a virtually conclusive pre-
sumption that the plain language governs, to milder formulations under which
the plain meaning governs except in 'rare' or 'exceptional' circumstances, or un-
der which the plain meaning 'ordinarily' controls." Miller, supra note 74, at 1222-
23 (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 241 (1989) ("[W]here... the statute's meaning is plain, 'the sole function of
the court is to enforce it according to its terms.'" (quoting Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 548 (1987) ("Although language seldom attains the precision of a
mathematical symbol, where an expression is capable of precise definition, we will
give effect to that meaning absent strong evidence that Congress actually in-
tended another meaning."); NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)
("Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under ei-
ther equity or the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise
dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms."); Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596, 617 (1981) ("The
wisest course is to adhere closely to what Congress has written."); Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("Absent a clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, [the statutory] language must ordinar-
ily be regarded as conclusive."); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)
("[L] egislative purpose is expressed in the ordinary meaning of the words used.");
In re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 1995) ("Generally, the plain meaning of
a statute controls.").
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the context of a statute, courts will apply the common, plain, and
established meaning of that word or phrase. 0
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius - the "expression
of one thing is the exclusion of another"81 - also is used by courts to
82interpret statutes. The maxim holds that "where a form of con-
duct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the per-
sons and things to which it refers are designated, there is an infer-
ence that all omissions should be understood as exclusions.",
3
In addition, courts also look to legislative intent to establish
statutory meaning and to construe vague or unclear statutes. 4 Leg-
islative history aids courts in interpreting and applying ambiguous
statutory language the way Congress intended. Legislative history
includes congressional records, statements made by members of
Congress, committee reports, and legislative debates.85 For exam-
ple, courts often examine the full history of a statute, from its in-
troduction to its enactment.8 6 Courts use the reports of standing
committees, special committees, conference committees, and
statements made at committee hearings to interpret statutory lan-
80. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 79, § 46.01, at 82-83; see also Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) ("[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be inter-
preted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.").
81. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
82. See, e.g., Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376 (1987) (stating that Con-
gress intended to include personal injury awards in AFDC recipients' incomes be-
cause Congress was silent in the AFDC statute but had been explicit elsewhere);
Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 106 (1987) (opining that
Congress will "authorize nationwide service of process when it wants to provide for
it"); cf., e.g., Taylor v. Investors Assocs., Inc., 29 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1994) (pro-
viding that the terms of a contract must be "apparent from the construction of the
contract to allow a third party beneficiary").
83. SUTHERLAND, supra note 79, § 47.23, at 216 (footnotes omitted).
84. See, e.g., Omni Capital Int'l, 484 U.S. at 106-07 (determining that Con-
gress did not authorize nationwide service for § 22 of the CFA by examining a
House of Representatives report); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441
U.S. 600, 607-08 (1979) (beginning its analysis of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim by
stressing that the Court's task is to interpret statutory language in light of Con-
gress' purpose for the statute); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 151 (1972) (emphasizing that the court must focus on congressional intent).
85. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 79, §§ 48.01-.20 (discussing the use of legis-
lative history in statutory interpretation).
86. See id. § 48.04, at 324. Courts can also consider the parts of bills that
were never enacted into law by the legislature. Id. at 325 ("[W]here the language
under question was rejected by the legislature and thus not contained in the stat-
ute it provides an indication that the legislature did not want the issue consid-
ered.").
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87guage.
V. RETROACTIVITYJURISPRUDENCE
Until the United States Supreme Court's 1994 decision in
Landgrafv. USI Film Products,s retroactivity law was in a state of flux.
Traditionally, American jurisprudence has disfavored retroactive
application of statutes and, before Landgraf courts had been un-
willing to apply a statute retroactively absent clear statutory intent.8 9
The principle against retroactivity is based on valued, deeply-
rooted beliefs about autonomy and fundamental fairness:9°
[T]he antiretroactivity principle finds expression in sev-
eral provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto
Clause flatly prohibits retroactive application of penal leg-
islation. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 prohibits States from passing an-
other type of retroactive legislation, laws 'impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.' The Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government
actors) from depriving private persons of vested property
rights except for a 'public use' and upon payment of 'just
compensation.' The prohibitions on 'Bills of Attainder'
in Art. I, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out
87. See id. §§ 48.06-.08, 48.10.
88. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
89. See id. at 286 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]here exists a judicial presump-
tion, of great antiquity, that a [nonpenal] legislative enactment affecting substan-
tive rights does not apply retroactively absent clear statement to the contrary.")
(emphasis omitted); District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of
Wholesale Sales Representatives v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551, 1569
(N.D. Ga. 1996); see also Nelson Lund, Retroactivity, Institutional Incentives, and the
Politics of Civil Rights, 1995 PUB. INTEREST L. REV. 87 (arguing that the Supreme
Court has become sensitive to political criticism of its civil rights jurisprudence
and that this sensitivity has warped its opinion of retroactivity in recent opinions
such as Landgraj); Elmer S. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation, A Basic
Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775, 775 (1936) (contending that bias
against retroactive laws is outdated).
90. The principle against retroactivity is derived from the idea that persons
should be entitled to have their behavior governed by laws that exist in advance of
their proscribed conduct. See Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legisla-
tion, 61 TExAS L. REv. 425, 470-72 (1982). Moreover, retroactive legislation is a
powerful tool which could be used as a means of retribution against unpopular
individuals or groups, and thus, must be carefully guarded against potential
abuse. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 266-68. Thus, if a statute is supposed to apply ret-
roactively, the general policy is for the legislature to explicitly state that intent. See
id. at 268-69. However, the retroactive application of statutes may serve legitimate
purposes such as correcting mistakes or responding to emergencies. See id. at 267-
68.
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disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment
for past conduct. The Due Process Clause also protects
the interests in fair notice and repose that may be com-
promised by retroactive legislation; a justification suffi-
cient to validate a statute's prospective application under
the Clause may not suffice to warrant its retroactive appli-
cation. 9'
Two Supreme Court cases prior to Landgraf show the Court's
indecision with regard to the retroactive application of statutes.
Although the Court in Bradley v. Richmond School Board allowed a
law to be applied retroactively,93 the Court subsequently reaffirmed
the traditional unwillingness to apply laws retroactively in Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital.94 Finally, in Landgraf the Court set
forth a test to determine whether a statute can be applied retroac-
tively absent clear legislative intent.9 5
A. Bradley v. Richmond School Board
In Bradley, the Supreme Court considered whether a statutory
amendment, which authorized courts to grant attorneys' fees in
school desegregation cases, pertained to expenses incurred prior
96to the amendment's effective date. Exercising its equitable pow-
ers, the district court had awarded such fees to the Bradley plain-
tiffs,' 7 but the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Congress
should authorize such awards, not the courts. 9 Before the Fourth
Circuit issued its decision, however, Congress passed the amend-
ment allowing attorneys' fees in school desegregation cases.99
The Supreme Court held that "a court is to apply the law in ef-
fect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result
in manifest injustice, or there is statutory direction or legislative
history to the contrary."'00 The amendment authorizing attorneys'
91. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation
omitted).
92. See Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
93. 416 U.S. at 705-21; see also infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
94. 488 U.S. at 208; see also infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
95. Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280; see also infra notes 108-36 and accompanying
text.
96. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 698-99.
97. Id. at 706-08.
98. Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1972).
99. See id.
100. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711. The Bradley Court grounded its conclusion on
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fees did not expressly state whether it was intended to apply to
pending suits. Because Congress chose to strike a clause from the
final version of the amendment expressly stating that the amend-
ment applied only to prospective claims, the Court was "reluctant
specifically to read into the statute the very fee limitation that Con-
gress had eliminated." 01 Hence, the Court concluded that the leg-
islative history indicated implicit support for the statute's applica-
tion to pending and prospective cases.102
B. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital
In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,0 3 the Supreme Court
shifted away from the Bradley decision and reaffirmed the tradi-
tional notion disfavoring retroactivity. 0 4 In Bowen, the Court exam-
ined whether a Medicare Act provision, allowing the United States
Secretary of Health and Human Services to set cost reimbursement
regulations and make retroactive corrective adjustments, extended
to retroactive promulgation of cost-limit rules.' The Court af-
firmed the court of appeals' decision, which held that the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act generally prohibits retroactive rulemaking
and that the Medicare Act's terms forbid retroactive cost-limit
United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801), in which the
Court held it must apply the terms of a convention that was entered into while the
case was on appeal. See id. at 711-13; see also Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S.
268, 281-83 (1969) (holding that although a new HUD regulation did not state
whether it applied to pending cases or to events occurring prior to its promulga-
tion, it was applicable to any resident who lived in the housing in question at the
time the rule was issued).
101. An earlier version of the bill contained an effective date clause provid-
ing that successful litigants would be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees "'for
services rendered, and costs incurred, after the date of enactment of this Act.'" Bradley,
416 U.S. at 716 n.23 (1974) (quoting S. 92-683 § 11(a) (1971)) (emphasis sup-
plied by the Court).
102. See id. at 716.
103. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
104. Id. at 208.
105. Id. at 204-05. The cost-limit provision dealt with a schedule that
changed the method for determining the 'wage index,' used to reflect salary lev-
els in various geographic regions. See id. at 206. The former rule determined the
geographic wage index by calculating the average salary levels for all hospitals
within that geographical area. See id. The new rule however, excluded wages paid
by federal government hospitals. See id. This new rule was subsequently invali-
dated by a federal district court and the Secretary used the former rule. See id.
Thereafter, the Secretary reinstated the new rule and began collecting the sums
formerly paid to the hospitals as a result of the district court's ruling. See id. at
206-07. The respondents initiated litigation to determine the validity of the retro-
active application of the cost-limit schedule. See id. at 207.
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rules. '0 6 The Court emphasized that retroactivity is not favored in
the law, and that absent specific language to the contrary, congres-
sional enactments and administrative rules will not be applied ret-
roactively.
10 7
The Court's requirement of an express statutory grant in or-
der to validate retroactive application departed from its holding in
Bradley. Rather than yield a concise rule regarding retroactive ap-
plication, the Court's decision merely fueled the already heated
debate over the proper interpretation.
C. Landgraf v. USI Film Products
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,'08 the United States Supreme
Court attempted to resolve the "apparent tension" between the
Bradley and Bowen decisions to determine whether a statute can be
applied retroactively. 109 In Landgraf the plaintiff alleged that she
had been sexually harassed and constructively discharged from her
job in violation of Title VII." ° The district court found that har-
assment had occurred, but that the plaintiff had not been construc-
tively discharged.' Accordingly, because Title VII, as then formu-
lated, provided only equitable relief and because the plaintiff was
not entitled to equitable relief based on the court's finding, the
complaint was dismissed."' Thereafter, however, Congress
amended Tide VII to afford compensatory and punitive damages
for certain violations and to allow a party to demand trial by jury if
such damages are sought."
3
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the amended version
of Title VII should apply to her case, but the Fifth Circuit refused
to remand the case for ajury trial because it was obligated to apply
the law in effect at that time." 4 On further appeal, the United
States Supreme Court's task was to determine whether the Fifth
Circuit "should have applied the law in effect at the time the dis-
criminatory conduct occurred, or at the time of its decision."" 5
106. Id. at 208.
107. Id.
108. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
109. Id. at 263.
110. See id. at 248.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 249.
113. See id.
114. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 250.
115. Id.
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Although an earlier version of the legislation expressly applied
to cases that arose before its enactment, the amendment actually
passed by Congress merely stated that it would take effect upon en-
actment "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided."1 6 The plain-
tiff argued that two sections of the legislation, which specified that
application of those particular provisions be prospective, strongly
implied that all of the Act's sections not specifically deemed pro-
spective applied to pending cases. 7  The Supreme Court dis-
agreed:
It is entirely possible that Congress inserted the 'otherwise
specifically provided' language not because it understood
the 'takes effect' clause to establish a rule of retroactivity
to which only two 'other specific provisions' would be ex-
ceptions, but instead to assure that any specific timing
provisions in the Act would prevail over the general 'take
effect on enactment' command .... We are also unper-
suaded by petitioner's argument that both [sections speci-
fying prospective application] merely duplicate the 'take
effect upon enactment' command of [the main effective
date clause] unless all other provisions.., apply to pend-
ing cases .... Congressional doubt concerning judicial
retroactivity doctrine, coupled with the likelihood that the
routine 'take effect upon enactment' language would re-
quire courts to fall back upon that doctrine, provide a
plausible explanation.., that makes neither [statutory]
provision redundant .... The history of the 1991 Act
conveys the impression that legislators agreed to disagree
about whether and to what extent the Act would apply to
preenactment conduct.""
Finding no guidance in the statute or its legislative history, the
Court turned to judicial default rules. The Court acknowledged
the "apparent tension" between canons of statutory construction, as
illustrated by the Bradley and Bowen decisions." 9 While Bradley re-
lied on the rule that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time
it renders its decision," 20 Bowen relied on the standard presump-
116. Id. at 257. The Court observed "[t]hat language does not, by itself, re-
solve the question before us. A statement that a statute will become effective on a
certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct
that occurred on an earlier date." Id.
117. Seeid.at258.
118. Id. at 261-63.
119. Id. at 263.
120. Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
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tion against retroactivity.1
According to the Landgraf Court, when the statute at issue is
unambiguous, no conflict exists between the principle embraced in
Bradley and a presumption against retroactivity.1 Even when a new
statute's language is not crystalline, its application is undeniable in
numerous situations.12  According to the Court, the intervening
statute could be applied properly in such situations where the legis-
lation confers or ousts jurisdiction, authorizes or affects the propri-
ety of prospective relief, or alters applicable procedural rules.24
The Court ultimately concluded that the provision affording a
jury trial "is plainly a procedural change of the sort that would or-
dinarily govern in trials conducted after its effective date," regard-
less of when the discriminatory conduct occurred. 5 However, be-
cause application of the provision authorizing punitive damages
would suggest a significant constitutional issue, and because the
statute did not explicitly authorize punitive damages for preenact-
ment conduct, the Court declined to find the provision applica-
ble.
126
The Court struggled more with the compensatory damages
provision but arrived at the same result.1 7 In the Court's view, al-
though the compensatory damage provision did not make unlawful
that conduct which was lawful when it occurred, the provision did
attach a vital new legal burden to discriminatory conduct. 2 Absent
clear congressional intent, therefore, such a provision should not
be applied to preenactment events.129 The Court concluded: "The
extent of a party's liability, in the civil context as well as the crimi-
121. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
122. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994) (citing
United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 107 (1805); illustrat-
ing that a statute which was passed while The Schooner Peggy was pending was ap-
plied at the time of the court's decision).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 274.
125. Id. at 280.
126. Id. at 281, 283.
127. See id. at 281-82. The Court discussed the difficulty of classifying com-
pensatory damages. It explained that the provision "does not make unlawful con-
duct that was lawful when it occurred," nor does it fit under any other "suspect
legislative purpose." Id. Thus, the court concluded that the provision "is not in a
category in which objections to retroactive application on grounds of fairness have
their greatest force." Id. at 282.
128. Landgraf 511 U.S. at 282-83.
129. Id. at 283.
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nal, is an important legal consequence that cannot be ignored." 30
The Court suggested the following analysis be employed to de-
termine whether a statute is impermissibly retroactive:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the
events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper
reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no
need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however,
the statute contains no such express command, the court
must determine whether the new statute would have ret-
roactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for
past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to trans-
actions already completed. If the statute would operate
retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it
does not govern absent clear congressional intent favor-
ing such a result. Hence, the presumption against ret-
roactivity "has consistently been explained by reference to
the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after the
fact."
3 2
Thus, according to the Landgraf court, when a statute contains
no express savings clause, courts construing that statute must apply
a three-prong test to determine whether the statute may be applied
to pending claims. 3 3 The first prong of the test is to determine
whether applying the statute to pending claims "would impair
rights a party possessed when he acted." 134 The second prong of
the test focuses on whether applying the statute to pending claims
would "increase a party's liability for past conduct." 3 Finally, the
third prong involves determining whether applying the statute to
pending claims would "impose new duties with respect to transac-
tions already completed.',
13 6
130. Id. at 283-84.
131. Id. at 280.
132. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 280.
134. Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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VI. COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE
PSLRA's RICO AMENDMENT
Since the enactment of the PSLRA of 1995, the legislation's ef-
fective reach has encountered differing interpretations by various
courts. In 1996, four courts examined the applicability of section
107 of the PSLRA to pending claims. 3 7 Three of these courts held
that section 107 applies prospectively only, and not to claims pend-
ing at the time Congress enacted the PSLRA.'s One court, how-
ever, has held that in fact section 107 does apply to pending
claims.
13 9
A. Prospective Application to Pending RICO Claims
Three federal courts have held that the RICO amendment ap-
plies only prospectively. In reaching this conclusion, these courts
relied primarily upon the Landgraf test to determine retroactivity in
light of statutory interpretation and legislative intent.
4 1
1. District 65 Retirement Trust v. Prudential Securities, Inc.
In District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Whole-
sale Sales Representatives v. Prudential Securities, Inc., the statute of
limitations had run on the plaintiffs' securities fraud claims.143 Ac-
cordingly, RICO was the only available avenue for redress of their
securities fraud allegations.'" The plaintiffs claimed wire and mail
fraud as predicate acts under RICO. 145 Therefore, because these
137. See District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Whole-
sale Sales Reps. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551, 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1996);
In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 79 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Reading Wireless Cable Television Partnership v. Steingold, No. CV-5-95-
785-DWH (LRL), 1996 WL 728045, at *2 (D. Nev. July 23, 1996); Bromm v. Pre-
mier Capital Invs. Corp., No. 4: CV-95-3327, slip op. 1, 3 (D. Neb. May 30, 1996).
138. See District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1568-69; In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp.
at 78-79; Bromm, No. 4: CV95-3327, slip op. at 3.
139. See Reading Wireless, 1996 WL 728045, at *2.
140. See District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1570; In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at
79 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Bromm, No. 4: CV95-3327, slip op. at 3.
141. See District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1570; In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at
79 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Bromm, No. 4: CV95-3327, slip op. at 3-4.
142. 925 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
143. Id. at 1570.
144. Id. at 1568.
145. Id. at 1567.
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acts were pleaded in relation to underlying activity that would have
been actionable as securities fraud, section 107 required the court
had to determine whether the amendment applied retroactively to
bar these claims.'4
Relying on the Landgraf test, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia concluded that " [e]liminating
predicate acts upon which plaintiffs have rested their complaint for
civil RICO remedies, and thereby causing their RICO claims to col-
lapse, impairs the plaintiffs' ability to recover for actions which may
have violated federal law. Thus, the statute would operate retroac-
tively."" 7  Furthermore, the court held that in accordance with
Landgraf the statute should apply retroactively only upon a show-
ing of clear congressional intent favoring such a result.'" The
court found that because Congress specifically provided for pro-
spective application for securities claims, its failure to express simi-
lar intent in regard to RICO claims demonstrates a lack of clear in-
tent.149  Accordingly, the court declined to apply the statute
retroactively. 50 Interestingly, however, the court qualified its hold-
ing by recognizing that there was latitude for difference of opinion
on the issue of retroactivity:15' "Immediate appeal of this order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of this case."'52
2. In re Prudential Securities Incorporated Limited
Partnerships Litigation
In In re Prudential Securities Incorporated Limited Partnerships Liti-
gation,15 a class of defendants, relying on the PSLRA, contested the
court's jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' RICO claims that were based
146. Id. at 1568. The court deferred to the Congressional Record, which
stated, "'[T]he Conference Committee intends that a plaintiff may not plead
other specified offenses, such as mail or wire fraud, as predicate acts under civil
RICO if such offenses are based on conduct that would have been actionable as
securities fraud.'" Id. at 1567 (quoting 141 CONG. REc. H13,691-98, H13,704
(Nov. 28, 1995)).
147. Id. at 1570.
148. District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Wholesale
Sales Reps. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551, 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnership Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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upon predicate acts of securities fraud. 1 4
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York first discussed the legislative history surrounding the Act
and, specifically, section 107.1" The court acknowledged that nei-
ther proponents nor opponents of the action questioned whether
the provision should apply to pending claims. 56  However, "both
sides refer[red] to the provision as putting a stop to RICO suits
with securities fraud as predicate acts."" 7 Accordingly, the court
found that the legislative history, like the Act itself, was silent as to
the application of the provision to pending claims."58
The court did not discuss its specific findings with respect to
the Landgraf test but, rather, restated the analysis set forth in Dis-
trict 65.159 The court then focused its attention on the overriding
factor of clear congressional intent. 6 The court acknowledged
that the best argument for retroactive application was based in the
traditional support given to the RICO amendment by the Chair-
man of the SEC and members of the judiciary. 6 The court further
recognized that statements made in a House debate "may support
the urgency of altering RICO and the notion that Congress in-
154. Id.
155. See id. at 77-78.
156. Id. at 78.
157. Id. Several representatives voiced their support of the RICO amend-
ment, and it may be gleaned from some statements that the Act was to have retro-
active effect. See id. Notably, Representative McCollum stated:
I intend to introduce RICO reform. It is my hope that the subcommittee
will bring forward legislation to help ensure that the RICO statutes are
used in the manner that Congress originally intended. In the interim,
however, this amendment will stop some of the most egregious abuses of
the civil RICO statute .... This amendment will put an immediate stop to
one of the greatest abuses of the civil RICO statute.
141 CONG. REc. H2774 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. McCollum)
(emphasis added), quoted in In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 78.
158. In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 78.
159. Id. at 79-80.
160. See id. at 80. This factor is key to both the statutory interpretation and
Landgraf lines of analysis. A retroactive finding under Landgraf can be defeated if
a litigant can show that Congress clearly intended the statute to apply retroac-
tively. See id. at 81; District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of
Wholesale Sales Reps. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551, 1570 (N.D. Ga.
1996).
161. See In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 80 (referencing 141 CONG. REc.
H2771 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995), wherein Representative Cox explained that SEC
Chairman Arthur Leavitt, "[i]n testimony before the [House Committee on the
Judiciary], stated that [the Act] contained the kind of civil RICO reform that is
necessary.").
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tended an immediate halt (including pending cases) to what it
considered an extremely deleterious use of the statute."'' 62 In fur-
ther support of retroactivity, the court put forth the argument that
Congress could have explicitly provided for only prospective appli-
cation, if it so intended. 163 Nonetheless, the court held that while it
was possible the lack of clear intent in the statute was the result of
the rushed nature of the debate and proposal, the fact remains that
"[w]hatever the reason, the statute does not include the type of
clear expression that the RICO provision is to apply retroactively
required under the Landgrafdecision."'1 As a result, the court de-
termined that the RICO provision applied prospectively and, thus,
did not bar plaintiffs' claims.1u
3. Bromm v. Premier Capital Investments Corporation
In Bromm v. Premier Capital Investments Corporation, the United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss and held that the Act's RICO amendment
166did not apply retroactively to bar pending claims. The court did
not discuss its reasoning except for a brief, one-sentence statement:
Suffice it to say that the words and structure of the Re-
form Act (particularly sections 107 and 108), the legisla-
tive history, and precedent from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court
convince me that the Reform Act should not be applied to
RICO cases like this one pending before the date of en-
actment.1
67
The court did not expand further upon its holding or specific fac-
162. In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 80. The court was referencing
statements made by persons testifying before the House, including a comment by
Judge Milton Pollack in which he stated:
[O]ne of the proliferating developments in civil litigation has been the
use of RICO.. . in civil claims, in routine commercial disputes, includ-
ing those arising under the federal securities laws. I think that the pro-
liferation of these claims and the use of a law that was designed to elimi-
nate organized crime is a very bad influence on the commercial
community.
Id. (quoting 141 CONG. REc. H2773 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of Judge
Milton Pollack)).
163. See id. at 80.
164. Id. at 81.
165. Id. at 77, 81.
166. No. 4: CV95-3327, slip. op. at 4 (D. Neb. May 30, 1996).
167. Id. The court's only cited support was District 65, which held that the
amendment did not apply retroactively. See id.
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tual determinations.'6
4. Synthesizing the Decisions
Although the three courts finding prospective application of
the RICO amendment varied somewhat in the weight accorded to
particular lines of analysis or canons, the bases for their conclu-
sions were the same.169 The courts agreed that the plaintiffs in
these actions were denied access to a right which previously existed
and that despite evidence of congressional intent regarding the
purpose of the RICO amendment, the plain language and legisla-
tive history failed to demonstrate a clear intent to apply the
amendment retroactively.' 70 Hence, the courts ruled in accordance
with the general presumption disfavoring retroactive application
absent clear congressional intent to the contrary.
B. Retroactive Application of the Act to Pending RICO Claims: Reading
Wireless Cable Television Partnership v. Steingold
Although three courts have held that section 107 of the PSLRA
applies to prospective claims only, the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada, relying upon statutory interpretation
and legislative intent viewed in conjunction with the Landgraf test,
recently interpreted section 107 to call for application of section
107 to pending RICO claims.171 In Reading Wireless Cable Television
Partnership v. Steingold, the defendants sought to dismiss the RICO
causes of action based on underlying securities fraud and asserted
that section 107 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ap-
plied retroactively so as to preclude pending claims.77 The court,
relying heavily upon statutory interpretation and legislative intent,
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 140-68 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions
in District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Wholesale Sales
Reps. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Ga. 1996); In re Prudential
Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnership Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) and Bromm, No.
4: CV-95-3327 (D. Neb. May 30, 1996)).
170. See In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 80-81; District 65, 925 F. Supp. at
1569-70. Although the court in Bromm did not detail its reasoning, it summarily
stated that its opinion was based on the plain language of the statute, legislative
history, case precedent, and specifically, the findings in District 65. See Bromm, No.
4: CV-95-3327, slip op. at 4.
171. See Reading Wireless Cable Television Partnership v. Steingold, No. CV-
S-95-785-DWH (LRL), 1996 WL 728045, at *2 (D. Nev. July 23, 1996).
172. Id. at*1.
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held that the purpose of section 107 was to remove a damages pro-
vision that Congress considered inequitable and unnecessary.173
Additionally, the court noted that this provision, "taken together
with the implication given by the omission from section 108's spe-
cific temporal reach language of any mention of the RICO
amendment, calls for retrospective application... as to plaintiffs'
RICO claims.'
74
In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to the purpose of
the RICO amendment and concluded that its only purpose was to
eradicate what Congress viewed as an "unfair piling on of liability
in cases where remedies for the same conduct had long since been
in place and were adequate to address it."
17 5
The court recognized the presumption of Landgraf but dis-
counted its application in this case. 76 Specifically, the court noted
"retroactively taking away an unnecessary and unfairly cumulative
remedy in no way runs counter to the underpinnings of the usual
presumption against retroactivity described by Justice Stevens in
Landgraf"'77 Therefore, relying on the nature of section 107, the
court concluded the amendment did not come within the class to
which the general presumption against retroactivity applies. 
17
173. Id. at *3.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *2.
176. Id.
177. Reading Wireless, 1996 WL 728045, at *2. In Landgraf, Justice Stevens
said the court's duty is to
ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events
completed before its enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule
operates "retroactively" comes at the end of a process of judgment con-
cerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree
of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past
event.
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994), quoted in Reading Wire-
less, 1996 WL 728045, at *2. Accordingly, when the statute is enacted subsequent
to the events being litigated, and congressional intent is unclear with respect to
the statute's application, the court must decide whether retroactive application
"would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability
for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already com-
pleted." Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280, quoted in Reading Wireless, 1996 WL 728045, at
*2.
178. Reading Wireless, 1996 WL 728045, at *3.
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VII. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SECTION 107
TO PENDING RICO CLAIMS
The application of section 107 of the PSLRA has produced
significant conflict among litigants and courts. With respect to
statutory interpretation and legislative intent, litigants defending
against RICO claims argued:
[B]ecause Congress expressly provided for prospective
application in section 108 [of the PSLRA] for lawsuits aris-
ing under the securities laws, it should be inferred from
its failure to so provide for lawsuits arising under RICO
that Congress intended the opposite for the RICO
amendment in the immediately preceding section 107.Y1
9
Alternatively, RICO plaintiffs in securities fraud cases argue that
"[i]f Congress had truly sought to distinguish section 107 from sec-
tion 108's clearly expressed prospective application, it could have
inserted the appropriate retroactive language in either statutory
provision. ""'8 While both sides present tenable arguments, the fact
that the amendment is open to varying interpretations has caused
some courts to conclude that it is impossible to discern clear con-
gressional intent from the plain language of the statute.181
These litigants rise and fall in light of the traditional prohibi-
tion disfavoring retroactivity18
2 and the test set forth in Landgraf
8 3
Under Landgraf the court evaluates whether a party is deprived of
a right that previously existed to determine if a statute should apply
retroactively. 84 Naturally, defendants assert that section 107 does
179. In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnership Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 77-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau
of Wholesale Sales Reps. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551, 1568-69 (N.D.
Ga. 1996) (discussing retroactivity and differing approaches to determine con-
gressional intent).
180. In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 78. In Landgraf the Supreme Court
considered a similar "negative inference" argument and denied the prospective
application of a statutory provision where Congress only implied its intent. See
District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1568-69.
181. See District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1570; In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at
80-81; Bromm v. Premier Capital Invs. Corp., No. 4: CV95-3327, slip op. at 4 (D.
Neb. May 30, 1996).
182. Compare District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1568-70, and In re Prudential Sec., 930
F. Supp. at 79-81, with Reading Wireless, 1996 WL 728045, at *1, *3.
183. 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
184. Id.; see also Reading Wireless, 1996 WL 728045, at *3 (applying the Land-
graf test); In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 79 (applying the standards set forth
in Landgra); District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1569 (following the Landgraf instruction
on a test regarding retroactivity).
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not impair a right that previously existed because that right re-
mains available under securities fraud causes of action."5 Mean-
while, plaintiffs emphasize that application of section 107 to pend-
ing claims extinguishes a right that existed prior to the enactment
of the PSLRA and, in some cases, effectively eliminates a party's
ability to recover under traditional securities-based claims. 86
The cases construing section 107 understandably have yielded
conflicting interpretations regarding its application, as courts have
been forced to impart their impressions of congressional intent
amidst legislative silence. 187 In reaching their conclusions, the
courts have placed unwarranted reliance upon the traditional pre-
sumption disfavoring retroactive application.88 Instead, a proper
analysis of the canons of statutory construction leads to the conclu-
sion that section 107 does apply to pending claims.'8 9 In addition,
an application of the Landgraf test dictates that section 107 of the
PSLRA should apply to pending RICO claims in the securities con-
text.'90
A. Statutory Construction Favors Application of Section 107 to Pending
Claims
The use of accepted canons of statutory construction to inter-
pret section 107 of the PSLRA clearly indicates that the amend-
ment to RICO should apply to both future claims and pending
claims. Three canons are pertinent here: the plain meaning rule,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and legislative intent.
185. See, e.g., District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1569 (considering whether section
107 impairs rights that a party previously possessed); In re Prudential Sec., 930 F.
Supp. at 79 (stating that section 107 does impair a plaintiff's right to recover).
186. See, e.g., District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1570.
187. See Reading Wireless, 1996 WL 728045, at *3 (applying retroactive appli-
cation of Title I of plaintiffs claims); District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1570 (holding that
section 107 did not apply retroactively to bar plaintiffs claims); In re Prudential
Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 79 (stating the statute should not apply retroactively absent a
clear expression of intent by Congress to that effect).
188. See District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1568; In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at
79.
189. See discussion infra Part VIIA.
190. See discussion infra Part VII.B.
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1. The Plain Meaning Rule
The plain meaning rule dictates that courts apply the common
and established meaning of words and phrases.' 9 ' Section 107 of
the PSLRA provides that "no person may rely upon any conduct
that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of
the securities" to establish a RICO violation. 192 The amendment
does not directly address limiting the claims to which it applies. In-
stead, the provision states that no one can bring a claim under
RICO for securities fraud violations.' The plain language of the
statute does not indicate any sort of prospective application re-
quirement. The statute is silent as to application. Thus, the plain
meaning of such silence is that the section applies to all pending
and future RICO claims.
2. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
The statutory maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius dictates
that where the applicability of a statute is expressed therein, omis-
sions of application should be understood to be excluded purpose-
fully. 194 The savings clause in section 108 of the PSLRA states that
the Act does not apply to pending private securities claims, but
only to future claims. 95 The Act is silent as to the applicability of
section 107 to pending RICO claims. If Congress had not intended
section 107 to apply to pending claims, either it would have in-
cluded RICO in the savings clause in section 108 or it would have
provided a general prospective savings clause without restriction.
Because Congress specifically included a savings clause in section
108 stating that the Act does not apply to pending securities claims,
Congress' omission of a savings clause in section 107 should be
understood to be purposefully excluded. In other words, Congress
did not intend section 108's savings clause to apply to RICO claims.
If Congress did not intend section 108's "prospective only" savings
clause to apply to RICO claims under section 107, it follows that
section 107 does apply to pending RICO claims.
191. SeeSUTHERLAND, supra note 79, § 46.01, at 81.
192. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §
107, 109 Stat. 737, 758.
193. Id.
194. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 79, § 47.23, at 216-17.
195. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 108, 109 Stat. at 758.
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3. Legislative Intent
Although the original House and Senate bills that were to be-
come the PSLRA contained no general savings clauses, a savings
clause with respect to claims brought under the 1933 and 1934 Se-
curities Acts was added to the Senate bill in committee. 9 6 The
amended Senate bill stated that the amendments in the PSLRA
"shall not affect or apply to any private action arising under title I
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or title I of the Securities
Act of 1933 commenced before the date of enactment of this
Act.' 1 7 After the House rejected the Senate bill, the House and
Senate both adopted a bill with a different savings clause as to se-
curities claims. 198 The new savings clause, which later became sec-
tion 108 of the PSLRA, provided that the PSLRA amendments
"shall not affect or apply to any private action arising under title I
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or title I of the Securities
Act of 1933 commenced before and pending on the date of the en-
actment of this Act."' 99 Although this provision expressly applies
only to prospective claims brought under the 1933 and 1934 Secu-
rities Acts, nothing in the PSLRA states whether section 107, which
limits civil RICO claims, applies to pending claims.200 Moreover, at
no time during the adoption or modification of the savings clause
was there discussion of the RICO amendment.20' Yet, by enacting
the PSLRA, Congress clearly intended to end frivolous RICO
claims in the securities context.2 2 In order to achieve fully Con-
gress' goal of ending frivolous RICO claims in the securities con-
text, and with no evidence to the contrary, section 107 should ap-
ply to pending claims.
Congress likely failed to include civil RICO in the PSLRA sav-
ings clause in section 108 in response to the growing abuses of the
civil RICO remedy in the context of securities litigation. As Justice
Marshall noted in his dissent in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., "private
civil actions under the statute are being brought almost solely
196. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
197. S. 240, 104th Cong. § 110 (2d version June 20, 1995).
198. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
199. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 108, 109 Stat. at 758 (empha-
sis added).
200. See In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68,
78 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
201. See id.
202. See id. at 77; supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss3/5
NUNC PRO TUNC
against [respected businesses], rather than against the archetypal,
intimidating mobster. Yet this defect - if defect it is - is inherent in
the statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress."
20 3
Justice Marshall recognized that "in its private civil version, RICO is
evolving into something quite different from the original concep-
tion of its enactors." 204 Thus, the inherent abuses of civil RICO
were recognized as problematic a decade before any legislative ac-
tion was taken. Congress was well aware of the abusive use of civil
RICO in the context of securities fraud litigation when it enacted
the reformative measures, and therefore likely declined to include
civil RICO in the specific prospective savings clause in section 108
of the PSLRA.205 Because the RICO reform was so long in coming,
it logically follows that section 107 was meant to put an immediate
halt to the frivolous pleading of civil RICO in securities fraud litiga-
tion. In doing so, it did not preclude all remedial measures for se-
curities fraud or valid civil RICO violations. It merely attempted to
restore the use of civil RICO to its proper context.
Before the PSLRA, it was too easy to satisfy the pleading re-
quirements under the civil RICO provision with respect to securi-
ties fraud violations.0 6 In the criminal RICO context, prosecutors
exercise restraint and discretion in bringing such actions. 2°7 In the
private context, however,
[L]itigants have no reason to avoid displacing state com-
mon-law remedies. Quite to the contrary, such litigants,
lured by the prospect of treble damages and attorney's
fees, have a strong incentive to invoke RICO's provisions
whenever they can allege in good faith two instances of
mail or wire fraud. Then the defendant, facing a tremen-
dous financial exposure in addition to the threat of being
labeled a 'racketeer,' will have a strong interest in settling
the dispute.0 8
Congress' enactment of section 107 was a long-awaited re-
203. 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1984) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 500.
205. See In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 77-78.
206. See id. at 79 (quoting Representative Cox, who argued that without sec-
tion 107, a plaintiff's attorney alleging a single violation is able to obtain a hefty
settlement).
207. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 503 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 504 (citing Rakoff, Some Personal Reflections on the Sedima Case and
on Reforming Rico, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 400 (Law Journal Seminars-Press
1984)).
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sponse to a serious misuse of a statutory remedy.209 The long-
standing abuse demonstrates the immediate need for reform and
retroactive application. It is not meant as a prospective deterrent,
but rather an immediate attempt to remedy a serious and abusive
practice.
From an economic perspective, the misdirected use of civil
RICO in the securities fraud context places a severe financial bur-
den on defendants, who, when threatened with potential treble
damages, settle cases that are often without merit, simply to avoid
greater economic loss. 210  Basic economic principles dictate that
such occurrences result in higher costs to consumers. Thus, not
only does civil RICO burden corporate defendants, it places fur-
ther economic burdens upon consumers. Again, Congress was
aware of the burdens civil RICO placed on defendants, and likely
enacted section 107 to immediately halt the abuses and burdens of
civil RICO.
B. Using the Landgraf Test
Not only do statutory maxims and principles of legislative in-
tent dictate that section 107 should apply to both pending and fu-
ture RICO claims in the securities context, but an application of
the Landgraf test clearly indicates that the application of section
107 to pending claims is not impermissibly retroactive. Using the
principles set forth in Landgraf the validity of retroactivity is de-
termined by using a three-prong test.2 11 This test evaluates whether
the new legislation would impair rights a party possessed when the
action occurred, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or im-
pose new duties regarding transactions already completed.212 In
the civil RICO context, only the first of the three prongs is relevant.
The two remaining prongs are irrelevant because section 107
would not increase a party's liability or impose new duties with re-
spect to completed transactions. In fact, the amendment would
decrease a party's potential compensatory liability by restricting the
use of civil RICO and the accompanying treble damages provision.
209. See id. at 505.
210. See Letter from L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, to the Honorable William J. Hughes, Chair, House Sub-
committee on Crime (June 9, 1989) (stating that of the 855 civil RICO cases in
1988, only 14 went to jury trial).
211. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
212. See id.
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Instead, the only relevant issue under Landgraf is whether ap-
plication of section 107 to pending claims would impair rights a
party possessed at the time of the complained-of conduct or when a
suit was filed.11  If an amendment operates so as to impair the
rights a party possessed before its enactment, it is said to have ret-
roactive effect, and therefore, traditionally is disfavored in the
law. 14 Generally, the presumption is that a law with retroactive ef-
fect will not govern absent clear congressional intent in favor of
application to pending claims. "15 The presumption disfavoring ret-
roactivity is relied upon by plaintiffs in pending civil RICO actions
to overcome challenges by defendants seeking dismissal of the ac-
tions in light of the amendment.
2 16
Contrary to the findings of the majority of the courts to decide
this issue, 17 the application of section 107 to pending RICO claims
does not deny plaintiffs access to a right they possessed before sec-
tion 107 was enacted. Plaintiffs alleging securities fraud violations
may still pursue a cause of action, but are confined to the remedies
and restrictions contained in the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934.18 Retroactive application of section 107 does not leave plain-
tiffs whose suits are pending without a remedy. It merely limits re-
dress to the proper provisional remedies and limitations. In the
event there is an underlying RICO violation, a plaintiff may pursue
a civil RICO action in conjunction with a securities fraud claim in
cases where the defendant is first criminally convicted. This pre-
requisite restores RICO to its original intended purpose of deter-
213. See id.
214. See District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of the Bureau of Whole-
sale Sales Reps. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551, 1569 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(indicating that the focus of the court's analysis is whether section 107 impairs
rights a party possessed when he acted, increases a party's liability for past con-
duct, or imposes new duties with respect to transactions already completed); In re
Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(concluding the RICO amendment does impair the plaintiff's ability to recover
because the plaintiffs complaint will be stripped of RICO claims after the statute
of limitations for securities fraud claims likely has expired).
215. See District 65, 925 F. Supp. at 1569 (analyzing the canons of statutory
construction outlined in Landgraf regarding whether the RICO amendment
should be applied to pending claims).
216. See, e.g., In re Prudential Sec., 930 F. Supp. at 77-81; District 65, 925 F.
Supp. at 1568-70.
217. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
218. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
§ 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758.
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ring racketeering practices.1 9
A notable exception exists with respect to claims that take ad-
vantage of the extended statute of limitations period contained in
civil RICO because they failed to meet the three-year limitations
period for securities fraud allegations.2 2 0 Arguably, failing to allow
these plaintiffs to pursue their civil RICO claims denies them access
to a right they possessed before the amendment was enacted. In
essence, applying section 107 to their pending claims denies then
the right to any recovery at all, because the shorter statute of limi-
tations has run on their securities claims under the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts. However, these plaintiffs are using civil RICO as a
back door to initiate otherwise stale claims. Before the PSLRA,
plaintiffs needed to allege only two instances of wire or mail fraud
in order to resurrect their stale claims and take advantage of civil
RICO's four-year statute of limitations. In so doing, these plaintiffs
are accorded an added bonus of potential treble damages. The in-
centives and inherent abuses in this practice are obvious. It is pre-
cisely this type of frivolous litigation that Congress sought to elimi-
nate by passing the PSLRA and, specifically, section 107. Section
107 itself does not deny a plaintiff access to a previously existing
right. Rather, the statute of limitations of the securities claim that
the plaintiff should have brought extinguishes the underlying right to
bring a securities-based fraud claim. Accordingly, section 107 does
not have detrimental retroactive effects as described by the Land-
graf court.
VII. CONCLUSION
By enacting section 107, Congress clearly intended to put an
end to frivolous RICO claims. It is unlikely Congress intended sec-
tion 108's prospective savings clause regarding private securities
claims to incorporate pending RICO claims when the purpose of
section 107 is to remove RICO from private securities actions.
Congress apparently intended to separate RICO from private secu-
rities claims.
The plain language of section 107, as well as the statutory
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, dictates that the statute
should apply to both pending and prospective RICO claims.
Moreover, Congress' intent to put an end to frivolous RICO claims
219. See discussion supra Part II.
220. See Mathews, supra note 22, at 938-39.
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and to deter abusive litigation practices would be served by apply-
ing section 107 to pending RICO claims.
Although retroactive application of congressional enactments
traditionally is disfavored in the law, section 107 of the PSLRA war-
rants an exception. The rule against retroactivity is generally ap-
propriate in most circumstances. Section 107, however, passes the
three-prong Landgraf test and does not subject plaintiffs or defen-
dants to the traditional inequities found in retroactive application.
Accordingly, courts should apply section 107 to pending RICO
claims and end abusive litigation practices.
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